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NOTE
RETROACTIVE APPLICATION OF STATE LONG-ARM
STATUTES
Dane Reed Ullian* **
Abstract
A precondition to a court’s exercising any measure of authority over an
individual or an entity is the court’s establishment of personal jurisdiction.
A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant
only if the forum state provides a statutory basis for exercising jurisdiction
over the nonresident and the exercise of jurisdiction satisfies the
constitutional due process standard. Personal jurisdiction is one of the most
commonly litigated issues today, due primarily to confusion over the
constitutional standard.
Commentators and courts write extensively about the constitutional
prerequisites for personal jurisdiction, but say little about state long-arm
statutes. Perhaps this should not come as a surprise. Long-arm statutes are
often similar from state to state. Their interpretation is usually dry and
straightforward. The Due Process Clause enables courts and commentators
to be creative. Nevertheless, long-arm statutes provide at least one issue
that merits consideration: states differ on whether their respective long-arm
statutes apply retroactively and in their reasoning. These differences can
decide a case, lead to illogical results, and affect judicial efficiency. For
those reasons, this Note surveys the current position of the states on longarm statute retroactivity and examines differences in the states’ reasoning.
Hopefully the discussion serves as a useful summary of state law and
provides helpful suggestions for future long-arm statute drafting and
interpretation.
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INTRODUCTION
A court may subject a nonresident defendant to the court’s jurisdiction
only if the forum state provides a statutory basis for exercising jurisdiction
over the nonresident and the exercise of jurisdiction satisfies the
constitutional due process standard.1 Most states codify multiple bases for
jurisdiction over a nonresident in their respective “long-arm” statutes.2 In
response to court interpretations, the evolution of the constitutional
standard, changes in technology, and globalization, states frequently amend
or rewrite their long-arm statutes.3 An amended long-arm statute raises the
1. 4A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 1069 (3d ed. 2002).
2. See statutes cited infra note 38.
3. See, e.g., Petroleum Helicopters, Inc. v. Avco Corp., 513 So. 2d 1188, 1190–91 (La.
1987) (discussing three amendments to the Louisiana long-arm statute in less than twenty years); S.
Pac. Transp. Co. v. Fox, 609 So. 2d 357, 360 & n.5 (Miss. 1992) (discussing four amendments to
the Mississippi long-arm statute in less than thirty years); see also Act of June 14, 2013, ch. 164,
2013 FLA. LAWS ch. 2013-164, http://laws.flrules.org/2013/164 (allowing a contract forum selection
clause as an additional basis for Florida long-arm jurisdiction, arguably to supersede the holding of
McRae v. J.D./M.D., Inc., 511 So. 2d 540, 544 (Fla. 1987)).
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issue of retroactivity. Does the amended long-arm statute apply
retroactively to all causes of action, or does the statute apply prospectively
only? Describing a statute as retroactive or prospective in the personal
jurisdiction context is something of an oversimplification because a longarm statute could fix at one of four different moments: when the
nonresident allegedly commits the jurisdiction-conferring act,4 when the
cause of action accrues,5 when the nonresident defendant is served with
process,6 or when the nonresident defendant challenges personal
jurisdiction.7
For example, suppose that a nonresident negligently constructs a
building in Florida before Florida’s long-arm statute enumerates
committing a tort as a jurisdiction-conferring act. After the building’s
construction, Florida amends the long-arm statute to include committing a
tort as a basis for jurisdiction. Later, the negligently constructed building
collapses, injuring an occupant, who sues in Florida and serves the
nonresident defendant with process outside of Florida. Does a court apply
the long-arm statute in effect when the nonresident committed the
jurisdiction-conferring act (i.e., when the nonresident built the building) or
the long-arm statute in effect when the cause of action accrued (i.e., when
the building collapsed)?8 Suppose instead that Florida amends the longarm statute after the nonresident is served with process but before the
nonresident challenges personal jurisdiction. Can an amendment to the
state’s long-arm statute validate service that was ineffective when made?9
Courts frequently grappled with these questions in the 1960s and 1970s,
4. See, e.g., Pub. Gas Co. v. Weatherhead Co., 409 So. 2d 1026, 1027 (Fla. 1982) (applying
the long-arm statute in effect when the nonresident defendant manufactured and distributed the
product at issue rather than the statute in effect when the product injured the resident plaintiff).
5. See, e.g., Deering Milliken Research Corp. v. Textured Fibres, Inc., 415 F.2d 875, 876–
77 (4th Cir. 1969) (applying the long-arm statute in effect when the nonresident breached a contract
despite the fact that the jurisdiction-conferring act was the making of a contract to be performed
within the state).
6. See, e.g., Kilbreath v. Rudy, 242 N.E.2d 658, 660 (Ohio 1968) (finding the Ohio longarm statute to be remedial and declaring that “[l]aws of a remedial nature are applicable to any
proceedings conducted after the adoption of such laws”).
7. See, e.g., Petroleum Helicopters, Inc., 513 So. 2d at 1190, 1192 (applying a version of the
Louisiana long-arm statute that was amended after the nonresident defendant challenged personal
jurisdiction).
8. See, e.g., Pub. Gas Co., 409 So. 2d at 1027 (applying, under circumstances similar to the
preceding hypothetical, the long-arm statute in effect when the nonresident defendant manufactured
and distributed the product at issue).
9. In most circumstances, the answer to this question is “no.” E.H. Schopler, Annotation,
Retrospective Operation of State Statutes or Rules of Court Conferring In Personam Jurisdiction
over Nonresidents or Foreign Corporations on the Basis of Isolated Acts or Transactions, 19
A.L.R.3d 138, 142–46 (1968). But see Rose v. Franchetti, 979 F.2d 81, 85–86 (7th Cir. 1992)
(applying a version of the Illinois long-arm statute that was amended after the plaintiff served the
nonresident defendant with process); Petroleum Helicopters, Inc., 513 So. 2d at 1192 (reaching the
same result under Louisiana law).
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but the issue arises less frequently of late. From 1960 through 1980, courts
addressed whether the long-arm statutes of at least twenty-four states
applied retroactively.10 Since 1980, McBead Drilling Co. v. Kremco, Ltd.11
is the only reported case in which a state’s highest court addressed longarm statute retroactivity as an issue of first impression.12 That fact might
suggest that the issue is settled law across all of the states, but at least two
states with single-act long-arm statutes have never directly addressed
whether their statute applies retroactively,13 and several states have not
definitively fixed the point at which their long-arm statute applies.14
Additionally, in several jurisdictions, the only reported decisions
addressing long-arm statute retroactivity come from federal district courts
and therefore leave this state law issue open to future interpretation.15
Given the dearth of modern commentary on the issue of long-arm
statute retroactivity, this Note seeks to provide a cogent, up-to-date starting
point for litigators researching the retroactivity of a particular state’s longarm statute. This Note also seeks to identify some of the fallacies relied
upon by the minority of states that apply their long-arm statute
prospectively only. To that end, Part I introduces personal jurisdiction law,
long-arm statutes, the implied consent theory, and retroactivity analysis.
10. Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Shwayder Bros., 384 S.W.2d 473, 476 (Ark. 1964); Hoen v. Dist.
Court, 412 P.2d 428, 431 (Colo. 1966); Carvette v. Marion Power Shovel Co., 249 A.2d 58, 61
(Conn. 1968); Eudaily v. Harmon, 420 A.2d 1175, 1179–80 (Del. 1980); Gordon v. John Deere
Co., 264 So. 2d 419, 420 (Fla. 1972); Bauer Int’l Corp. v. Cagle’s, Inc., 171 S.E.2d 314, 317 (Ga.
1969); Krueger v. Rheem Mfg. Co., 149 N.W.2d 142, 148 (Iowa 1967); Woodring v. Hall, 438
P.2d 135, 143 (Kan. 1968); Rose v. E.W. Bliss Co., 516 S.W.2d 329, 330 (Ky. 1974); Hardy v.
Rekab, Inc., 266 F. Supp. 508, 517 (D. Md. 1967); Kagan v. United Vacuum Appliance Corp., 260
N.E.2d 208, 211 (Mass. 1970); Hunt v. Nev. State Bank, 172 N.W.2d 292, 307 (Minn. 1969);
Mladinich v. Kohn, 186 So. 2d 481, 483 (Miss. 1966); Scheidegger v. Greene, 451 S.W.2d 135,
139 (Mo. 1970); State ex rel. Johnson v. Dist. Court, 417 P.2d 109, 113 (Mont. 1966); Prop.
Owners Ass’n at Suissevale, Inc. v. Sholley, 284 A.2d 915, 916–17 (N.H. 1971); Gray v. Armijo,
372 P.2d 821, 827 (N.M. 1962); Simonson v. Int’l Bank, 200 N.E.2d 427, 432 (N.Y. 1964); Keller
v. Clark Equip. Co., 367 F. Supp. 1350, 1353 (D.N.D. 1973), rev’d on other grounds, 570 F.2d 778
(8th Cir. 1978); Kilbreath v. Rudy, 242 N.E.2d 658, 660–61 (Ohio 1968); Howard v. Allen, 368 F.
Supp. 310, 316 (D.S.C. 1973); Myers v. U.S. Auto. Club, Inc., 281 F. Supp. 48, 52–53 (E.D. Tenn.
1968); Walke v. Dall., Inc., 161 S.E.2d 722, 725 (Va. 1968); Teague v. Damascus, 183 F. Supp.
446, 448–50 (E.D. Wash. 1960).
11. 509 So. 2d 429 (La. 1987).
12. Id.
13. See cases citing the relevant long-arm statutes in West’s Utah Code Annotated and West’s
Alaska Statutes Annotated. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-3-205 (West 2012) (Utah long-arm statute);
ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 09.05.015 (West 2012) (Alaska long-arm statute).
14. See, e.g., J.C. Penney Co. v. Malouf Co., 196 S.E.2d 145, 147 (Ga. 1973) (holding that
the applicable long-arm statute for a tort claim is the statute in effect upon the nonresident
defendant’s commission of the tort). Note that a tort is not “complete” until there is an injury but
that “commission” suggests that the defendant’s allegedly tortious acts are relevant. So, the correct
measuring point in Georgia could be when the nonresident defendant does the wrongful act or when
the cause of action accrues.
15. See federal district court cases cited supra note 10.
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Part II begins by describing a few representative jurisdictions that apply
their long-arm statute retroactively and then describes each state that
applies its long-arm statute prospectively only. Part III illustrates the
illogical and inefficient effect of prospective-only long-arm statutes. This
Note concludes that universal retroactive application of long-arm statutes
best conforms to common law retroactivity analysis and constitutional law.
I. IMPLIED CONSENT THEORY AND APPROACHES TO RETROACTIVITY
A. Introduction to Personal Jurisdiction Law
A precondition to a court’s exercising any measure of authority over an
individual or entity is the establishment of jurisdiction over the person.16
Personal jurisdiction is one of the most commonly litigated issues today,
due primarily to confusion over the constitutional standard.17 A court
generally need not address whether it has personal jurisdiction over a
plaintiff, because the plaintiff’s filing a lawsuit in a court establishes that
court’s jurisdiction over the plaintiff.18 Personal jurisdiction over a
defendant, the involuntary participant in a typical lawsuit, empowers a
court to compel the defendant’s presence.19 A court exercises such
authority through service of process, but by what standard does a court
allow a defendant to be served with process? Both federal and state courts
exercise personal jurisdiction with reference to state personal jurisdiction
law and constitutional due process.20
A state court’s authority is coextensive with that of the state.21 Before
the fiction of corporate presence and the realities of modern transportation
and commerce muddied the waters,22 personal jurisdiction was inextricably
tied to a state’s territorial jurisdiction.23 Personal jurisdiction over a
nonresident could be established by serving the nonresident with process
within the territorial boundaries of the state,24 attaching in-state property
16. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722 (1878), abrogated by Int’l Shoe Co. v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945), and Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
17. Russell J. Weintraub, A Map Out of the Personal Jurisdiction Labyrinth, 28 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 531, 531 & n.5 (1995).
18. Adam v. Saenger, 303 U.S. 59, 67–68 (1938).
19. See Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 722. Although it may seem strange to modern lawyers, at one
time courts could physically force a civil defendant to appear in court. 6A C.J.S. Arrest § 90 (2013).
20. See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945); FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(1)
(authorizing service to establish personal jurisdiction when the defendant would be subject to the
state court’s jurisdiction).
21. Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 722.
22. See, e.g., Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316–19 (discussing the evolution of personal jurisdiction
and concluding that “the boundary line . . . cannot be simply mechanical or quantitative”).
23. See Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 722.
24. A notable example of transient or “tag” jurisdiction is Grace v. MacArthur, 170 F. Supp.
442, 447 (E.D. Ark. 1959) (allowing personal jurisdiction based on the defendant having been
served with process while on an airplane in Arkansas airspace).
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owned by the nonresident,25 or by the nonresident’s having manifested
consent to the state’s jurisdiction.26 Although the U.S. Supreme Court in
Pennoyer v. Neff began to describe personal jurisdiction limitations with
reference to the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,27
nineteenth and early twentieth century “courts continued to employ
‘power,’ ‘presence,’ and ‘consent’ in describing adjudicative authority.”28
By the mid-twentieth century, technology and increasing interstate
commerce had so thoroughly undermined a plaintiff’s ability to secure a
remedy under traditional personal jurisdiction law that the U.S. Supreme
Court dramatically rewrote the constitutional personal jurisdiction standard
in International Shoe Co. v. Washington.29 International Shoe was
groundbreaking for several reasons. First, the Court described a new due
process test: personal jurisdiction over a nonresident requires “certain
minimum contacts with” the forum state and must conform to “traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice.”30 Perhaps more relevant to this
Note, International Shoe attempted to discard the fictional bases for
personal jurisdiction that had developed over the preceding fifty years as
power-based personal jurisdiction became increasingly unwieldy.31
25. Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 723.
26. Id. at 735 (explaining that a state may require certain nonresidents to appoint an in-state
agent to receive service on their behalf as a condition of creating an association or making a
contract). Pennoyer refers here to express consent. For a discussion of the early twentieth century
theory of implied consent, see infra Section I.B.
27. Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 733.
28. Charles W. “Rocky” Rhodes, Nineteenth Century Personal Jurisdiction Doctrine in a
Twenty-First Century World, 64 FLA. L. REV. 387, 396–97 & n.51 (2012).
29. 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945); see, e.g., Stephen Gardbaum, New Deal Constitutionalism and
the Unshackling of the States, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 483, 559 (1997) (“In the landmark case of
International Shoe Co v Washington, decided in 1945, the Court radically rewrote [the personal
jurisdiction] rules.”). Contra Rhodes, supra note 28, at 390 (“The familiar story is that
International Shoe is a ‘pathmarking’ or ‘canonical’ decision that wrought a fundamental change in
the personal jurisdiction doctrine developed in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. However, as
the following brief account of the development of American jurisdictional doctrine demonstrates,
International Shoe was an evolution, not a transformation.” (footnote omitted)).
30. Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940))
(internal quotation marks omitted); see also id. at 323 (Black, J., dissenting) (“[The majority] has
announced vague Constitutional criteria applied for the first time to the issue before us.”).
31. Id. at 316 (majority opinion) (describing the act from which a court would previously
imply consent to jurisdiction as the basis for jurisdiction rather than the fictional consent itself);
Philip B. Kurland, The Supreme Court, the Due Process Clause and the In Personam Jurisdiction
of State Courts, 25 U. CHI. L. REV. 569, 574, 586 (1958) (noting, first, that although the personal
jurisdiction rules before International Shoe “may be stated fairly succinctly, it should be noted that
they were not to be applied with equal ease” and, second, that the “doctrine [was] in so bad a state
of disrepair [that] the time had long since passed for the Supreme Court to” fix it); see also Rhodes,
supra note 28, at 395 (describing the earlier, fictional bases for personal jurisdiction); id. at 406
(“International Shoe banished the fiction of implied consent.”). But see J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v.
Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2787–88 (2011) (plurality opinion) (describing the minimum contacts
test as determining whether a defendant “submits to the judicial power of an otherwise foreign
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The new constitutional approach to personal jurisdiction over
nonresidents was not self-executing.32 To exercise this new long-arm
jurisdiction, state courts must have a statutory basis for jurisdiction that
comports with the International Shoe due process standard.33 For the first
ten years after International Shoe, states took a piecemeal approach,
adopting statutes that authorized long-arm jurisdiction in isolated
instances.34 In 1955, Illinois adopted the first comprehensive long-arm
statute, prompting many states to do the same.35 Today, every state has
either a comprehensive long-arm statute or a court rule to the same effect.36
State long-arm statutes generally belong to one of two categories:
single-act statutes and “go to the limit” statutes.37 As the name implies,
single-act long-arm statutes list specific acts that subject a nonresident of
the state to the jurisdiction of a court in that state as to any cause of action
arising out of the enumerated acts.38 Single-act statutes frequently
incorporate older concepts such as “doing business” with newer bases for
jurisdiction such as committing a tort and making or performing a contract
in the forum state.39 “Go to the limit” long-arm statutes, on the other hand,
sovereign” (emphasis added)).
32. See Douglas D. McFarland, Dictum Run Wild: How Long-Arm Statutes Extended to the
Limits of Due Process, 84 B.U. L. REV. 491, 493 (2004).
33. Id.; cf. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 1, § 1068.
34. McFarland, supra note 32, at 493–94.
35. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 1, § 1068; McFarland, supra note 32, at 494–95.
36. McFarland, supra note 32, at 496–97. In addition to a comprehensive long-arm statute,
many states codify other statutory bases for personal jurisdiction outside their long-arm statute. An
example is nonresident motorist statutes, discussed in Section I.B infra.
37. See Schopler, supra note 9, at 140 n.4. As it stands, however, these two categories lack
names uniformly used in the field of personal jurisdiction scholarship. See, e.g., McFarland, supra
note 32, at 496–97 (noting that the first category of long-arm statutes “have been called
‘enumerated-acts’ statutes, ‘specific act’ statutes, ‘tailored’ statutes, ‘laundry-list’ statutes, and
‘one-act’ statutes” and calling the second category “no-limits” statutes).
38. See ALASKA STAT. § 09.05.015 (2012) (listing acts that subject a nonresident to service
outside of the state); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-1-124 (2012) (same); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-59b(a)
(2013) (same); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 3104(c) (2013) (same); FLA. STAT. § 48.193 (2012)
(same); GA. CODE ANN. § 9-10-91 (2012) (same); HAW. REV. STAT. § 634-35 (2012) (same); IDAHO
CODE ANN. § 5-514 (2013) (same); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-209 (2012) (same); IOWA CODE
§ 617.3 (2013) (same); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 454.210 (West 2012) (same); MD. CODE ANN., CTS.
& JUD. PROC. § 6-103 (West 2012) (same); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 223A, § 3 (2012) (same); MICH.
COMP. LAWS §§ 600.705, 600.715, 600.725, 600.735 (2013) (same); MINN. STAT. § 543.19 (2012)
(same); MISS. CODE ANN. § 13-3-57 (2013) (same); MO. REV. STAT. § 506.500 (2012) (same);
MONT. R. CIV. P. 4(a)–(b) (same); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 510:4 (2013) (same); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 38-1-16 (2012) (same); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 302 (MCKINNEY 2013) (same); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-75.4
(2012) (same); N.D. R. CIV. P. 4(b) (same); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.382 (2013) (same); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 36-2-803 (2012) (same); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 17.042 (West 2013)
(same); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-3-205 (2013) (same); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-328.1 (2013) (same);
WASH. REV. CODE § 4.28.185 (2012) (same); W. VA. CODE § 56-3-33 (2012) (same); WIS. STAT.
ANN. § 801.05 (2013) (same).
39. See Schopler, supra note 9, at 140. Compare Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310
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bypass statutory enumeration and allow a court to exercise jurisdiction
under any circumstances that satisfy the constitutional due process
standard.40 In addition, some single-act statutes have been interpreted to
reflect the state legislature’s intention that personal jurisdiction “go to the
limit” of constitutional due process and are applied by the state’s courts as
“go to the limit” statutes.41
B. Implied Consent Theory
Single-act long-arm statutes42 are often similar from state to state,43 but
an important language difference can inform the differing interpretations
on retroactivity. Some long-arm statutes include implied consent
language.44 Implied consent language consists of a phrase such as “thereby
submits himself to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state”45 or “shall by
(1945) (doing business), with World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980)
(tort), and Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985) (contract).
40. See ALA. R. CIV. P. 4.2(b) (expressly allowing state courts to exercise jurisdiction over
nonresidents under any circumstances consistent with the Due Process Clause); ARIZ. R. CIV. P.
4.2(a) (same); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-4-101(b) (2012) (same); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 410.10
(West 2013) (same); IND. R. TRIAL P. 4.4 (same); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-308(b)(1)(L) (2012)
(same); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:3201(B) (2012) (same); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 14, § 704-A (2013)
(same); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-536 (2012) (same); NEV. REV. STAT. § 14.065 (2011) (same); N.J. R.
SUPER. TAX SURR. CTS. CIV. R. 4:4-4 (same); OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 2004(F) (2012) (same); OR. R.
CIV. P. 4(L) (same); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5322 (2012) (same); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-5-33 (2011)
(same); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 15-7-2(14) (2013) (same); TENN. CODE ANN. § 20-2-225 (2012)
(same); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 913 (2012) (same); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 5-1-107(a) (2012) (same).
Several of the states listed in this footnote list specific acts that will subject a nonresident to their
jurisdiction but also provide a “go to the limit” catchall provision in the statute. For simplicity, this
Note includes such statutes in the “go to the limit” category.
41. Compare, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 5-514 (2013) (listing specific acts that will subject a
nonresident to Idaho jurisdiction), with Doggett v. Elecs. Corp. of Am., Combustion Control Div.,
454 P.2d 63, 67 (Idaho 1969) (describing Idaho’s single-act long-arm statute as going to the limit of
the Due Process Clause). In the interest of consistency with statutory language, this Note attempts
to treat these statutes as belonging to the single-act long-arm statute category.
42. Because a “go to the limit” long-arm statute need not be amended, retroactivity will rarely
arise as an issue in “go to the limit” states. Also, a true “go to the limit” long-arm statute should
always apply retroactively, because the U.S. Supreme Court has held that the Due Process Clause
permits long-arm statute retroactivity. McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 224 (1957). So,
with a few exceptions, this Note disregards “go to the limit” long-arm statutes.
43. See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 1, § 1068 (“The first truly comprehensive long-arm
statute was enacted in Illinois and it has been copied or used as a model by a number of states.”
(footnotes omitted)). Compare, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-59b (2013), with MINN. STAT. § 543.19
(2012).
44. Schopler, supra note 9, at 141.
45. See FLA. STAT. § 48.193 (2012) (“Any person . . . who personally or through an agent
does any of the acts enumerated in this subsection thereby submits himself . . . to the jurisdiction of
the courts of this state . . . .”); see also COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-1-124 (2012) (substantially similar to
Florida); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 3104 ( 2012) (same); HAW. REV. STAT. § 634-35 (2012) (same);
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 5-514 (2013) (same); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-209 (2012) (same); MO. REV.
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such act or acts be deemed to be doing business” in the state46 or other
similar wording.47 The modern long-arm statute came into being after
International Shoe abandoned implied consent as a constitutional
justification for personal jurisdiction.48 So, the fact that many long-arm
statutes continue to use implied consent language may be attributable to
state legislators modeling the statutes after older nonresident motorist
statutes rather than to any particular legislative intent.49
The concept of actual consent to personal jurisdiction dates back at
least as far as Pennoyer,50 but implied consent emerged in the early
twentieth century as an answer to the development of the automobile.51 Not
having a sufficient statutory basis upon which to obtain jurisdiction over
nonresidents who caused damage or injury while driving through a foreign
state, state legislatures began to adopt nonresident motorist statutes.52 The
first generation of nonresident motorist statutes required nonresidents to
register before driving in the state, which registration required the
nonresident to expressly consent to a state official’s serving as an agent for
service of process on the nonresident’s behalf.53 The U.S. Supreme Court
later permitted states to bypass the registration and express consent
requirement and instead allowed states to infer a nonresident’s consent
from the nonresident’s driving in the state.54 In essence, implied consent
theorizes that the basis for a court’s jurisdiction over the defendant is not
the defendant’s doing an enumerated act—as modern single-act statutes
provide—but the effect of the defendant’s doing an enumerated act: an instate agent is now authorized to receive service on the defendant’s behalf.55
STAT. § 506.500 (2012) (same); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 510:4 (2013) (same); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 38-1-16 (2012) (same); WASH. REV. CODE § 4.28.185 (2012) (same).
46. IOWA CODE § 617.3 (2013) (“[S]uch acts shall be deemed to be doing business in Iowa by
such person for the purpose of service of process.”); MISS. CODE ANN. § 13-3-57 (2013)
(substantially similar to Iowa).
47. W. VA. CODE § 56-3-33 (2012) (“The engaging by a nonresident . . . in any one or more
of the acts specified [in the long-arm statute] . . . shall be a signification of such nonresident’s
agreement that any such process against him . . . shall be of the same legal force and validity as
though such nonresident were personally served . . . within this state.”).
48. See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 1, § 1068.
49. See, e.g., Krueger v. Rheem Mfg. Co., 149 N.W.2d 142, 147 (Iowa 1967).
50. 95 U.S. 714, 733 (1877) (disallowing substituted service of process on a nonresident with
a few exceptions including “cases in which that mode of service may be considered to have been
assented to in advance”).
51. See Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 356–57 (1927); see also Olberding v. Ill. Cent. R.R.,
346 U.S. 338, 341 (1953) (“[Implied consent to personal jurisdiction] rests on the inroad which the
automobile has made on the decision of Pennoyer . . . .”).
52. James J. Dambach, Personal Jurisdiction: Some Current Problems and Modern Trends, 5
UCLA L. REV. 198, 199 (1958).
53. See Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U.S. 160, 164 (1916).
54. Hess, 274 U.S. at 356–57.
55. See, e.g., Carvette v. Marion Power Shovel Co., 249 A.2d 58, 61 (Conn. 1968) (“Some
statutes, however, clearly provide that the performance of certain acts . . . is to be deemed an
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Although today the acts themselves create a sufficient constitutional
basis for a state to exercise jurisdiction over the person, more than a dozen
states still use implied consent language in their long-arm statute.56
Refusing to infer a defendant’s consent to jurisdiction based on acts that
were not yet enumerated when the defendant committed them, several
implied consent states either currently interpret or have previously
interpreted their long-arm statute to apply prospectively only.57 Adhering
to the legal fiction of consent, these courts reason that the enumeration of a
jurisdiction-conferring act cannot retroactively establish that, by having
previously committed the newly enumerated act, the defendant consented
to jurisdiction.58 Before elaborating on fictitious consent, this Note will
briefly discuss how courts generally determine whether a law applies
retroactively.
C. Retroactivity Analysis
Courts disfavor retroactively applicable laws.59 As such, a court will not
interpret a law as retroactive unless the legislature clearly intended that the
law apply retroactively.60 An exception to the clear legislative intent
requirement, however, exists for procedural and remedial laws.61 For
procedural or remedial laws, a court reverses the aforementioned
presumption and applies the law retroactively unless the legislature clearly
intended for the law to apply prospectively only.62 In the absence of
express statutory language, retroactivity analysis first asks if the law affects
substantive rights or procedure and then determines whether clear
‘implied consent’ to the appointment of the local designated officer as its agent for the purpose of
service of process.”); Chrischilles v. Griswold, 150 N.W.2d 94, 101 (Iowa 1967) (noting the statute
is based on implied consent). This distinction is still visible today in the divergent personal
jurisdiction philosophies of Justices Kennedy and Ginsburg. Compare J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v.
Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2788 (2011) (Kennedy, J.) (plurality opinion) (“The principal inquiry in
cases of this sort is whether the defendant’s activities manifest an intention to submit to the power
of a sovereign.”), with id. at 2799 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“Quite the contrary, the Court has
explained, a forum can exercise jurisdiction when its contacts with the controversy are sufficient;
invocation of a fictitious consent . . . is unnecessary and unhelpful.”).
56. See supra notes 45–47.
57. Schopler, supra note 9, at 142.
58. See, e.g., Carvette, 249 A.2d at 61 (“[I]t is impossible retroactively to imply consent.”);
Krueger v. Rheem Mfg. Co., 149 N.W.2d 142, 147 (Iowa 1967) (similar language).
59. E.g., Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 265 (1994) (“[T]he presumption against
retroactive legislation is deeply rooted in our jurisprudence, and embodies a legal doctrine centuries
older than our Republic.”); id. at 268 (“While statutory retroactivity has long been disfavored,
deciding when a statute operates ‘retroactively’ is not always a simple or mechanical task.”).
60. Id. at 270 (“Since the early days of this Court, we have declined to give retroactive effect
to statutes burdening private rights unless Congress had made clear its intent.”).
61. See id. at 273–75; id. at 275 (“Changes in procedural rules may often be applied in suits
arising before their enactment without raising concerns about retroactivity.”).
62. 73 AM. JUR. 2D Statutes § 240 (2012).
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legislative intent rebuts the applicable presumption.63
Substantive laws either modify or enhance a preexisting right or create
a right where one did not exist.64 Procedural laws, on the other hand,
address the means by which one vindicates a preexisting right.65 In the
context of long-arm statutes, the loaded question exposes itself: does a
nonresident defendant have the right to be free from the long-arm of a
proposed forum state’s jurisdiction? If so, a long-arm statute modifies the
substantive right to be sued in one’s home forum and presumptively
applies prospectively only.66 If, on the other hand, no substantive right is
implicated, then a long-arm statute merely addresses the procedure by
which a plaintiff vindicates a preexisting right to sue and the statute
presumptively applies retroactively.67
The U.S. Supreme Court describes jurisdictional laws—including longarm statutes—as procedural,68 and most states agree.69 The authority to
63. See id. at §§ 237, 240.
64. See Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 269–70 (“[T]he court must ask whether the new provision
attaches new legal consequences to events completed before its enactment.”).
65. Id. at 275 (“Because rules of procedure regulate secondary rather than primary conduct,
the fact that a new procedural rule was instituted after the conduct giving rise to the suit does not
make application of the rule at trial retroactive.”).
66. See infra Subsections II.B.1–2.
67. See infra Section II.A.
68. Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 274 (“Application of a new jurisdictional rule usually ‘takes away
no substantive right but simply changes the tribunal that is to hear the case.’ Present law normally
governs in such situations because jurisdictional statutes ‘speak to the power of the court rather than
to the rights or obligations of the parties.’” (citations omitted) (quoting Hallowell v. Commons, 239
U.S. 506, 508 (1916) and Republic Nat’l Bank of Miami v. United States, 506 U.S. 80, 100
(1992))); McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 224 (1957) (“The [California long-arm]
statute was remedial, in the purest sense of that term, and neither enlarged nor impaired
respondent’s substantive rights or obligations under the contract. It did nothing more than to
provide petitioner with a California forum to enforce whatever substantive rights she might have
against respondent.”).
69. At least twenty-seven state long-arm statutes have been described as either remedial or
procedural rather than substantive. Duple Motor Bodies, Ltd. v. Hollingsworth, 417 F.2d 231, 235
(9th Cir. 1969) (Hawaii law); Keller v. Clark Equip. Co., 367 F. Supp. 1350, 1353 (D.N.D. 1973),
rev’d on other grounds, 570 F.2d 778 (8th Cir. 1978); Howard v. Allen, 368 F. Supp. 310, 316
(D.S.C. 1973); Fed. Ins. Co. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 341 F. Supp. 855, 857 (W.D.N.C. 1972);
Hardy v. Rekab, Inc., 266 F. Supp. 508, 517 (D. Md. 1967); Chovan v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours &
Co., 217 F. Supp. 808, 811 (E.D. Mich. 1963); Lone Star Motor Imp., Inc. v. Citroen Cars Corp.,
185 F. Supp. 48, 52 (S.D. Tex. 1960), rev’d on other grounds, 288 F.2d 69 (5th Cir. 1961); Teague
v. Damascus, 183 F. Supp. 446, 450 (E.D. Wash. 1960); Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Shwayder Bros.,
384 S.W.2d 473, 476 (Ark. 1964); Hoen v. Dist. Court, 412 P.2d 428, 431 (Colo. 1966); Carvette
v. Marion Power Shovel Co., 249 A.2d 58, 60 (Conn. 1968); Eudaily v. Harmon, 420 A.2d 1175,
1180 (Del. 1980); Nelson v. Miller, 143 N.E.2d 673, 676 (Ill. 1957); Woodring v. Hall, 438 P.2d
135, 143 (Kan. 1968); Rose v. E.W. Bliss Co., 516 S.W.2d 329, 330 (Ky. 1974); Petroleum
Helicopters, Inc. v. Avco Corp., 513 So. 2d 1188, 1192 (La. 1987); Kagan v. United Vacuum
Appliance Corp., 260 N.E.2d 208, 210–11 (Mass. 1970); Hunt v. Nev. State Bank, 172 N.W.2d
292, 304 (Minn. 1969); Mladinich v. Kohn, 186 So. 2d 481, 482 (Miss. 1966) (holding that the
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define a right as substantive or procedural in the context of state law,
however, belongs to the respective states.70 Although most states use the
same test to categorize a statute as procedural or substantive, the split
between states arises partly because states answer the procedural–
substantive question differently,71 and on a state law issue, the state’s
answer controls.72
II. A SURVEY OF STATE APPROACHES TO RETROACTIVITY OF LONG-ARM
STATUTES
A survey of state long-arm statutes and court interpretations of their
meaning serves two (admittedly contradictory) purposes. First, litigators
interested in contesting personal jurisdiction based on non-retroactivity of
the relevant long-arm statute may appreciate the discussion.73 Second, a
thorough analysis may expose some of the weaknesses in interpreting a
long-arm statute as applying prospectively only and therefore may provide
support for anyone advocating for retroactive application. The survey
begins with the federal approach and two states that interpret their longarm statute to apply retroactively.
A. Retroactive Long-Arm Statutes
1. Federal Law
Federal law endorses retroactive application of jurisdictional laws. In
McGee v. International Life Insurance Co.,74 the U.S. Supreme Court
heard a Texas insurer’s challenge to the basis upon which a California
court exercised personal jurisdiction over the insurer.75 Often
overshadowed by McGee’s minimum contacts analysis is McGee’s analysis
of the insurer’s alternative argument: exercising jurisdiction based on a
long-arm statute that was enacted after the parties agreed to the insurance
contract impaired the obligation of contract (i.e., affected a substantive
long-arm statute was remedial, but that it applied only prospectively due to legislative intent);
Scheidegger v. Greene, 451 S.W.2d 135, 139 (Mo. 1970); State ex rel. Johnson v. Dist. Court, 417
P.2d 109, 113 (Mont. 1966); Prop. Owners Ass’n at Suissevale, Inc. v. Sholley, 284 A.2d 915, 916
(N.H. 1971); Gray v. Armijo, 372 P.2d 821, 827 (N.M. 1962); Simonson v. Int’l Bank, 200 N.E.2d
427, 431 (N.Y. 1964); Kilbreath v. Rudy, 242 N.E.2d 658, 660 (Ohio 1968); Walke v. Dall., Inc.,
161 S.E.2d 722, 724–25 (Va. 1968); Steffen v. Little, 86 N.W.2d 622, 625–26 (Wis. 1957).
70. See Smith v. Regina Mfg. Corp., 396 F.2d 826, 828 (4th Cir. 1968) (“The answer to
[questions of amenability to personal jurisdiction in a state] must be sought in [that state’s statutes]
and its highest court’s interpretations of those statutes.” (citation omitted)).
71. See infra Part II.
72. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
73. To that end, a table is appended to this Note that may provide a useful starting point for
more thorough research on the personal jurisdiction retroactivity law of a specific state.
74. 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
75. Id. at 221.
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right).76 McGee rejected the argument, succinctly declaring that “[t]he
statute was remedial, in the purest sense of that term, and neither enlarged
nor impaired respondent’s substantive rights or obligations under the
contract. It did nothing more than to provide petitioner with a California
forum to enforce whatever substantive rights she might have against
respondent.”77 McGee held (and the majority of states now agree)78 that a
personal jurisdiction law does not affect substantive rights and may
therefore apply to any cause of action regardless of whether the cause of
action arose before the law’s enactment.79
2. Illinois
Before McGee clarified federal constitutional law on the issue of longarm statute retroactivity, the Illinois Supreme Court correctly anticipated
the U.S. Supreme Court’s holding80 and delivered one of the most
influential state court opinions on long-arm statute retroactivity.81 Nelson
v. Miller involved a nonresident’s challenging Illinois jurisdiction based on
a tort that the nonresident had allegedly committed in 1954, one year
before Illinois enacted its first comprehensive long-arm statute.82 Nelson is
unique both because of its influence on other states and because both the
jurisdiction-conferring act and the action’s filing preceded the long-arm
statute’s effective date.83
The Illinois Supreme Court faced federal constitutional and state law
challenges to retroactive application of the long-arm statute.84 The court
described the issue in simple terms: The amendment to the long-arm
statute “merely establishes a new mode of obtaining jurisdiction of the
person of the defendant in order to secure existing rights, which are
unaffected by this amendment.”85 The court’s characterization disposed of
76. Id. at 224.
77. Id.
78. See infra Appendix.
79. See McGee, 355 U.S. at 224.
80. Compare Nelson v. Miller, 143 N.E.2d 673, 676 (Ill. 1957) (decided June 17, 1957), with
McGee, 355 U.S. at 224 (decided Dec. 16, 1957).
81. A Westlaw KeyCite of Nelson shows that cases in thirty-seven states (excluding Illinois)
cite Nelson. At least four courts rely heavily on Nelson, holding that the relevant state long-arm
statute applies retroactively. See Hoen v. Dist. Court, 412 P.2d 428, 431 (Colo. 1966); Gray v.
Armijo, 372 P.2d 821, 826–27 (N.M. 1962); Teague v. Damascus, 183 F. Supp. 446, 448–49
(E.D.Wash.1960); Steffen v. Little, 86 N.W.2d 622, 628–29 (Wis. 1957). Much of Nelson’s
influence owes to its status as the first state supreme court interpretation of the first state long-arm
statute. See McFarland, supra note 32, at 499.
82. Nelson, 143 N.E.2d at 675.
83. Id. Service on the nonresident defendant, however, was not obtained until after the longarm statute took effect. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 676 (emphasis added) (quoting Ogdon v. Gianakos, 114 N.E.2d 686, 690 (1953)).
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both the federal constitutional issue and the Illinois state law issue.86
Retroactive application of a long-arm statute does not offend the
Constitution because the amendments to the long-arm statute “do ‘not
extend either to destruction of an existing cause of action or to creation of a
new liability for past events.’”87 Similarly, Illinois’s retroactivity analysis
presumes that procedural laws apply retroactively.88
The court’s analysis of long-arm statute retroactivity did not end with
its characterization of the statute as procedural. Analogizing to nonresident
motorist statutes, the Illinois Supreme Court disparaged implied consent
doctrine:
It was characteristic of our legal institutions, however, that the
first approaches to a solution of the problem, both in the
legislatures and in the courts, were made not in terms of a bold
adjustment of legal concepts to a novel social problem, but in
terms that purported to fit the new provisions into the established
framework of jurisdictional concepts. The development
progressed from actual consent to the exercise of jurisdiction by
the appointment of an agent to accept service of process, to a
fictional consent implied from the use of the highways.
But it is now clear that the true basis for jurisdiction of the
nonresident motorist is something other than consent.89
Nelson abandoned the implied consent theory despite the fact that the
Illinois long-arm statute includes implied consent language.90 Rather than
contorting an outdated jurisdictional concept to fit into a modern context,
Nelson ignored the implied consent language and applied common law
retroactivity analysis.91 Because the long-arm statute merely describes
another method to validly serve a nonresident defendant, the long-arm
statute regulates procedure and is presumptively retroactive.92 In Illinois,
implied consent language does not sufficiently indicate a contrary
legislative intent to overcome the presumption in favor of retroactivity.93

86. Id. at 675–76.
87. Id. at 675 (quoting Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 554 (1949)).
88. Ogdon, 114 N.E.2d at 690.
89. Nelson, 143 N.E.2d at 677 (citations omitted).
90. See id. at 675 (quoting the amended long-arm statute: “[a nonresident person who does
one of the listed acts] thereby submits said person . . . to the jurisdiction of the courts of this State”);
see also 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-209 (2012) (using nearly identical language).
91. See Nelson, 143 N.E.2d at 675–76.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 676 (“[W]e are satisfied that jurisdiction does not rest upon such a fictional
consent.”).
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3. Connecticut
Like many states that apply their long-arm statute retroactively,
Connecticut’s long-arm statute does not include implied consent
language.94 In Carvette v. Marion Power Shovel Co., the Connecticut
Supreme Court held that the Connecticut long-arm statute affects only
procedure and therefore is presumptively retroactive.95 The Court found no
evidence to suggest that the legislature intended that the statute apply
prospectively only.96 Instead, the Court read the Connecticut long-arm
statute as providing a new forum in which a Connecticut resident could
redress his preexisting, substantive rights against a nonresident.97
Connecticut’s approach to long-arm statute retroactivity, aided by a statute
without implied consent language, is straightforward and mirrors that of
the U.S. Supreme Court.98
B. Prospective-Only Long-Arm Statutes
Most long-arm statutes resemble either the Illinois or the Connecticut
long-arm statute,99 and most states also apply the common law
presumptions on retroactivity.100 This Section examines the states that
nevertheless refuse to apply new or amended long-arm statutes
retroactively.
1. Florida
Florida’s original long-arm statute,101 which supplemented Florida’s
“doing business” personal jurisdiction statute,102 contained neutral
language, which suggests that the Florida Legislature had not adopted the
implied consent theory of personal jurisdiction.103 Nevertheless, in Gordon
94. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-59b (2013); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 454.210 (West 2012);
MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 6-103 (West 2013); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 223A, § 3 (2012);
MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 600.705, 600.715, 600.725, 600.735 (2013); MINN. STAT. § 543.19 (2012);
N.Y. C.P.L.R. 302 (MCKINNEY 2013); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-75.4 (2012); N.D. R. CIV. P. 4(b); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.382 (2013); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-803 (2012); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.
CODE ANN. § 17.042 (West 2013); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-328.1 (2012); WIS. STAT. § 801.05
(2012).
95. 249 A.2d 58, 60 (Conn. 1968).
96. Id. at 61.
97. Id. at 60.
98. Compare McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 224 (1957), with Carvette, 249 A.2d
at 60.
99. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
100. See supra Section I.C.
101. FLA. STAT. § 48.182 (1971) (repealed 1973).
102. FLA. STAT. § 48.181 (1971) (amended 1995).
103. In 1971, the long-arm statute read in relevant part: “Any nonresident person, firm, or
corporation who . . . commits a wrongful act outside the state which causes injury . . . within this
state may be personally served in any action or proceeding against the nonresident arising from any
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v. John Deere Co.,104 the Florida Supreme Court, on a certified question
from the Fifth Circuit,105 adopted the reasoning of a federal district court106
and held that Florida’s long-arm statute applied prospectively only.107 The
district court first described the substantive versus procedural–remedial test
for retroactivity and then analogized to earlier Florida appellate decisions
that addressed retroactivity in other situations.108 The district court focused
on the term “pre-existing remedy” to determine whether Florida’s long-arm
statute was remedial or substantive.109 If the law created a new remedy,
then the law affected a substantive right. If the law modified the rules for
adjudicating a preexisting remedy, then the law was merely procedural or
remedial in nature. The district court cited a Florida appellate case in
which the Florida Legislature had expressly described a different state
statute as remedial.110 Supported by no reasoning, the district court
declared that there was no preexisting remedy before the Florida
Legislature enacted the long-arm statute.111 In the absence of statutory
language explicitly describing Florida’s long-arm statute as remedial, and
under the belief that the long-arm statute created a new substantive right,
the district court was unwilling to apply the statute retroactively.112
Though the traditional approach would have been for the district court
to independently determine whether the long-arm statute implicated a
vested, substantive right,113 the district court’s decision to look for an
express legislative determination is defensible. Federal courts tread lightly
when addressing a state law issue of first impression.114 Gordon stands out
not because the district court decided the issue wrongly, but because the
Florida Supreme Court subsequently adopted the district court’s sparse
reasoning without analyzing the retroactivity issue for itself.115
In 1973, the Florida Legislature replaced § 48.182 with § 48.193.116 The
legislature seems to have adopted the Florida Supreme Court’s
interpretation, because the legislature rewrote the statute to include implied
such act . . . .” FLA. STAT. § 48.182 (1971) (repealed 1973).
104. 264 So. 2d 419 (Fla. 1972).
105. Gordon v. John Deere Co., 451 F.2d 234, 236 (5th Cir. 1971).
106. Gordon v. John Deere Co., 320 F. Supp. 293, 295–96 (N.D. Fla. 1970).
107. Gordon, 264 So. 2d at 420.
108. Gordon, 320 F. Supp. at 295–96.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 296.
111. Id. Contra supra Section II.A (discussing the U.S. Supreme Court and several states).
112. Gordon, 320 F. Supp. at 296.
113. See supra Section I.C.
114. See, e.g., Boyd v. Bowman, 443 F.2d 848, 849 (5th Cir. 1971) (electing not to “pre-guess
the Florida courts and dispose of th[e] controversy immediately . . . by trying to divine what the
State law will be though the markers are nonexistent or indistinct”).
115. Gordon v. John Deere Co., 264 So. 2d 419, 420 (Fla. 1972).
116. Act of June 13, 1973, ch. 73-179, 1973 Fla. Laws 364.
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consent language.117 Subsequent Florida Supreme Court interpretations of
§ 48.193 apply Gordon without noting the new implied consent
language.118
2. Georgia
Like Florida, Georgia prohibits retroactive application of its long-arm
statute based on a substantive rights theory.119 Unlike Florida, Georgia’s
long-arm statute does not use implied consent language.120 In Bauer
International Corp. v. Cagle’s, Inc., the Georgia Supreme Court held that a
1968 amendment to the 1966 long-arm statute could not be applied to a
cause of action that arose in 1967.121 The court considered the somewhat
murky language of the enacting legislation particularly indicative of a
prospective-only legislative intent.122 The court concluded that “the
Georgia long arm statute does not merely afford a different remedy for a
prior existing right, but affords a remedy against nonresidents where under
the prior law none existed in this State.”123
The Georgia Supreme Court referenced the appropriate rule in the very
sentence that it misapplied the rule. Enabling an aggrieved party to sue in
117. FLA. STAT. § 48.193 (2012) (“Any person . . . who . . . does any of the acts enumerated in
this subsection thereby submits himself or herself . . . to the jurisdiction of the courts of this
state . . . .”).
118. See, e.g., Fibreboard Corp. v. Kerness, 625 So. 2d 457, 459 (Fla. 1993); Conley v. Boyle
Drug Co., 570 So. 2d 275, 288 (Fla. 1990). This Note does not suggest that the Florida Supreme
Court must comment on the legislature’s apparent agreement with the court’s interpretation in
Gordon. The legislature’s implied consent language supplements the court’s substantive rights
reasoning and indicates its assent to the holding in Gordon. Interestingly, although the Florida
Supreme Court adopted implied consent doctrine, the court elsewhere discounts express consent as
a satisfactory basis for personal jurisdiction. McRae v. J.D./M.D., Inc., 511 So. 2d 540, 543–44
(Fla. 1987).
119. Bauer Int’l Corp. v. Cagle’s, Inc., 171 S.E.2d 314, 317 (Ga. 1969).
120. GA. CODE ANN. § 9-10-91 (2012). The relevant language of the Georgia long-arm statute
reads: “A court of this state may exercise personal jurisdiction over any nonresident . . . if . . . he or
she . . . .” Id. The language of the statute when Bauer International Corp. was decided is
substantially similar. 171 S.E.2d at 316.
121. Bauer Int’l Corp., 171 S.E.2d at 316–17.
122. Id. at 317.
123. Id. at 317. The Georgia Supreme Court distinguished Bauer International Corp. in
Ballew v. Riggs, 259 S.E.2d 482, 484 (Ga. 1979), holding that the 1977 amendment to the Georgia
long-arm statute did not affect substantive rights. Ballew should not be viewed as implicitly
overruling Bauer International Corp., however, because Ballew was careful to distinguish long-arm
statute amendments that add bases for jurisdiction (and therefore affect a substantive right) from
those that ensure a defendant cannot oust jurisdiction after the cause of action accrues. Id. (“[T]he
1977 amendment to the Long Arm Statute merely provides an alternate means of service upon one
who was a resident of Georgia at the time the cause of action arose and who subsequently moved to
another state before service could be perfected in Georgia.”). Ballew does however provide
litigators in Georgia with a persuasive basis upon which to argue that the court should reverse its
prospective-only rule.
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Georgia does not afford the party a new substantive right; rather it provides
a new forum in which to vindicate an existing substantive right.124 The
Georgia Supreme Court seemingly overlooked the fact that the aggrieved
party had a preexisting right to sue, just not in Georgia.125 In so doing, the
Georgia Supreme Court wrongly imposed a geographic limitation on the
scope of its substantive–procedural analysis. If Georgia law applies to a
cause of action, but the suit cannot proceed in Georgia, the aggrieved party
still has a preexisting right to sue.126 Georgia’s amended long-arm statute
merely added a forum in which an aggrieved party could vindicate a
preexisting right under Georgia law, and the court should have declared the
statute procedural rather than substantive in nature.127 Absent clear
legislative intent to the contrary,128 the Georgia long-arm statute should
have been applied retroactively.
3. Mississippi
While the Florida and Georgia Supreme Courts emphasized substantive
rights, the Mississippi Supreme Court cited legislative intent in interpreting
Mississippi’s long-arm statute to apply prospectively only. In Mladinich v.
Kohn,129 the Mississippi Supreme Court first squarely addressed whether
the Mississippi long-arm statute applied retroactively.130 The action
involved a tort that was allegedly committed in 1962, two years before the
long-arm statute authorized Mississippi jurisdiction over the nonresident
defendant.131 It is unclear, however, whether the Mississippi Supreme
Court differentiated between retroactivity as to the nonresident defendant’s
conduct and retroactivity as to service of process.132
124. McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 224 (1957) (“It did nothing more than to
provide petitioner with a California forum to enforce whatever substantive rights she might have
against respondent.”). Of course, Georgia enjoys the freedom to disagree with the Supreme Court in
interpreting the Georgia long-arm statute, and canons of statutory construction remain viable only
as long as a state’s highest court continues to apply them to state law. See supra Section I.C. The
Supreme Court’s reasoning is merely persuasive in this context.
125. Bauer Int’l Corp., 171 S.E.2d at 316 (“The asserted claim of the appellee was for goods
sold and delivered to the appellant through 1967.”); id. at 317 (“[The long-arm statute] affords a
remedy against nonresidents where under the prior law none existed in this State.” (emphasis
added)).
126. See, e.g., Rose v. Franchetti, 979 F.2d 81, 85 (7th Cir. 1992) (“Rules for personal
jurisdiction do not regulate primary conduct. Massachusetts substantive law governs this dispute no
matter where the litigation occurs . . . .”).
127. See McGee, 355 U.S. at 224.
128. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
129. 186 So. 2d 481 (Miss. 1966).
130. Id. at 481, 483–84.
131. Id. at 482.
132. See id. In Snavely v. Nordskog Electric Vehicles “Marketeer,” 947 F. Supp. 999, 1008
(S.D. Miss. 1995) the district court argued that Mladinich prevented retroactivity only when the
long-arm statute is amended after service of process. Specifically, the Snavely court argued:
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The court initially described the common maxim that, absent clear
legislative intent, statutes are not to be applied retroactively unless they
regulate only procedure.133 Although the court identified the Mississippi
long-arm statute as remedial,134 the court explained that Mississippi does
not except remedial laws from a presumption against retroactivity.135
Mississippi requires clear legislative intent to apply any law (substantive or
remedial) retroactively.136 The court cited the statute’s implied consent
language, use of the future tense, and enactment clause as evidence that the
legislature intended the long-arm statute to apply prospectively only.137
Accordingly, Mississippi’s long-arm statute,138 unless amended to reflect a
different legislative intent, applies prospectively only.139
While Mississippi’s inclusion of remedial laws in the presumption
against retroactivity is a minority approach,140 it benefits from consistency.
The Mladinich plaintiffs commenced their cause of action well before the 1964
amendment to [the Mississippi long-arm statute], and the new complaint, asserting
the same factual allegations as their previous complaint, could not have [the]
benefit of the amended statute since that would be tantamount to a retrospective
application of the 1964 amendment.
Id. Accordingly, Snavely found that the 1991 amendment to the long-arm statute applied to the
defendant based on the defendant’s conduct in 1986, because the plaintiff served the defendant with
process after the amendment’s effective date. Id. at 1002–03, 1008. It is not clear that Snavely read
Mladinich correctly. Although the Mladinich plaintiffs had originally filed suit (and hence served
process) before the 1964 amendment became effective (July 1, 1964), the trial court “dismissed the
suits for want of jurisdiction” and the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed in a June 1, 1964
opinion. Mladinich v. Kohn, 164 So. 2d 785, 786–87 (Miss. 1964). It is thus likely, though not
certain, that the Mladinich plaintiffs filed a new lawsuit (and hence served process again) after July
1, 1964. Some of the language in the two Mladinich opinions supports this proposition. Mladinich,
186 So. 2d at 481 (“The predecessor of this case is [the 1964 Mladinich opinion and] involved
substantially the same factual allegations made in the instant case.” (emphasis added)); id. at 482
(“The present actions . . . involved substantially the same charges for the same tort.”); Mladinich,
164 So. 2d at 789 (noting that the new long-arm statute does not apply because it is not effective
until one month from the date of the opinion). The ambiguity in Mladinich illustrates a point made
infra Part III, that prospective-only application of long-arm statutes creates illogical results and
confuses courts.
133. Mladinich, 186 So. 2d at 483.
134. Id. at 482–83 (“[The long-arm statute] is remedial. It did not create a cause of action, but
provided a method of obtaining in personam jurisdiction in Mississippi courts for a tort.”).
135. Id. at 483.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. MISS. CODE ANN. § 13-3-57 (2013).
139. Mladinich, 186 So. 2d at 484. But see supra note 132. Although the present long-arm
statute no longer contains implied consent language, see § 13-3-57, it is still written in the future
tense, id., and the enacting clause of the most recent amendment also suggests prospective-only
application. Act of April 12, 1991, 1991 Miss. Laws. ch. 573, § 142 (“[T]his act shall take effect
and be in force from and after July 1, 1991.”).
140. See supra Section I.C.
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In removing the manipulable substantive–remedial element from
retroactivity analysis, Mississippi courts look for clear legislative intent to
reverse a general presumption against retroactivity.141 The certainty of
Mississippi’s approach may well be illusory, however, because Mississippi
courts continue to apply procedural laws retroactively.142 As manipulable
as the substantive–remedial distinction can be, the remedial–procedural
distinction is even more difficult to delineate.143 Also of note, the
Mladinich test for retroactivity may have been implicitly overruled.144 If
Mississippi today presumes that remedial statutes apply retroactively
absent contrary legislative intent, then characterizing the Mississippi longarm statute as remedial should lead future Mississippi courts to apply the
statute retroactively.
4. Iowa
Iowa also stands as one of the few holdouts against the overwhelming
trend toward disregarding implied consent language and applying long-arm
statutes retroactively.145 In Krueger v. Rheem Manufacturing. Co.,146 the
Iowa Supreme Court held that Iowa’s legislature had specifically adopted
the fiction of implied consent and, in so doing, had evinced its intent that
the long-arm statute apply prospectively only.147 Krueger is distinct among
long-arm statute retroactivity cases both because it is one of the few post141. Mladinich, 186 So. 2d at 483.
142. See Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Shelnut, 772 So. 2d 1041, 1051 (Miss. 2000) (“Application
of a statute which affects procedural . . . rights to causes arising prior to the statute’s effective date
but tried thereafter is not an impermissible retroactive application.”); Oliphant v. Carthage Bank, 80
So. 2d 63, 72 (Miss. 1955) (“[W]hen proceedings are in process under a statute . . . and a new act is
passed, modifying the statute under which the proceedings were begun, the new statute becomes
integrated into and a part of the old statute as fully as if written therein from the very time the old
statute was enacted.”).
143. See Leslie Southwick, Retroactivity, in General—Procedural Changes, in 8
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MISSISSIPPI LAW § 68:104 (Jeffrey Jackson & Mary Miller eds., 2012), available
at Westlaw MSPRAC-ENC (noting the tendency of Mississippi courts to expand their definition of
procedure to apply laws retroactively).
144. See Bell v. Mitchell, 592 So. 2d 528, 533 (Miss. 1991) (“Remedial statutes relating to
remedies which do not take away vested rights but only operate in furtherance of the remedy do not
come within the general rule against retrospective operation of statutes.”). Despite a direct conflict
in the two cases’ description of the Mississippi approach to retroactivity of remedial statutes, Bell
did not cite Mladinich and did not consider personal jurisdiction.
145. Compare Krueger v. Rheem Mfg. Co., 149 N.W.2d 142, 147–48 (Iowa 1967), with
Teague v. Damascus, 183 F. Supp. 446, 447, 450 (E.D. Wash. 1960), Hoen v. Dist. Court, 412 P.2d
428, 429, 431 (Colo. 1966), Eudaily v. Harmon, 420 A.2d 1175, 1179 (Del. 1980), Nelson v.
Miller, 143 N.E.2d 673, 675–76 (Ill. 1957), Scheidegger v. Greene, 451 S.W.2d 135, 139, 146 n.1
(Mo. 1970), Prop. Owners Ass’n at Suissevale, Inc. v. Sholley, 284 A.2d 915, 917 (N.H. 1971)
(disregarding the implied consent language of New Hampshire’s long-arm statute cited supra note
45), and Gray v. Armijo, 372 P.2d 821, 827 (N.M. 1962).
146. 149 N.W.2d 142.
147. Id. at 147–48.
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McGee cases to base its prospective-only holding on implied consent and
because it does so while soundly discrediting the notion that implied
consent has a basis in constitutional law.
After a hot water heater exploded in their home, the Krueger plaintiffs
sued the manufacturer and a subcomponent manufacturer for negligence.148
The explosion occurred one year before Iowa’s long-arm statute enabled
Iowa courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident corporation
based on the corporation’s committing a tort in Iowa.149 The statute, which
is substantially similar to today’s Iowa long-arm statute,150 was a
substituted service statute that used the implied consent language: “shall be
deemed to constitute the appointment of the secretary of state.”151 The
court identified the statute as adhering to the implied consent theory, but
did not consider the statute’s implied consent language to immediately
foreclose retroactive application.152
In Krueger, the Iowa Supreme Court considered the effect of McGee
and International Shoe on implied consent doctrine.153 The court agreed
with Illinois and many other states that, under the U.S. Constitution,
personal jurisdiction laws can be purely remedial and retroactively
applicable.154 The court noted, however, that state legislatures are not
obligated to abandon the implied consent legal fiction as a matter of state
law and that “[i]t is a legislative, not judicial, function to extend or enlarge
jurisdiction over foreign corporations.”155 Krueger cited several state law
cases in which a court interpreted a substituted service long-arm statute as
affecting substantive rights.156 According to Krueger, substituted service
long-arm statutes (which include implied consent language) give
nonresidents a choice of whether to consent to substitute service.157 A court
cannot deem a nonresident to have impliedly consented before the
substituted service statute’s enactment.158 The court concluded that implied
consent language in a substituted service statute indicates the legislature’s
intent that the long-arm statute apply prospectively only.159
By distinguishing the federal constitutional aspect of retroactivity
analysis from the state law aspect, the Iowa Supreme Court gives
148. Id. at 143.
149. Id. at 143–44.
150. Compare id. (quoting Iowa’s 1963 long-arm statute), with IOWA CODE § 617.3(2) (2013).
151. Krueger, 149 N.W.2d at 144 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Iowa’s 1963 long-arm statute).
152. See id. at 147–48.
153. Id. at 145.
154. Id. at 147.
155. Id. (quoting Hill v. Elecs. Corp. of Am., 113 N.W.2d 313, 318 (Iowa 1962)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
156. Id. at 145.
157. See id. at 145–46.
158. Id. at 146.
159. Id. at 147.
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credibility to its holding and casts some doubt on the many state courts that
interpret their long-arm statute to apply retroactively in spite of implied
consent language. Alternatively, one might consider Krueger to have given
undue significance to the otherwise dying implied consent theory.160 For
example, the dissent in Krueger argued that “[i]f plaintiff had a cause of
action against defendants prior to enactment of [the long-arm statute], then
[the statute] simply served to accord him a new local forum. This is
procedural.”161 The dissent observed quite succinctly that, whatever the
legislative intent behind implied consent language, a procedural statute is
presumed to operate retroactively absent unambiguous legislative intent to
the contrary.162 As this Note shows, and as the dissent argued, implied
consent language is far from unambiguous.163
A subsequent decision by the Iowa Supreme Court held that the
applicable long-arm statute fixes when the defendant commits the allegedly
negligent acts rather than when the cause of action accrues.164 Interestingly,
Justice Stuart, who wrote for the majority in Krueger, dissented in the
subsequent case, arguing that “the majority opinion gives more substance
to the implied consent theory than it is entitled to.”165 Justice Stuart argued
that an implied consent long-arm statute need not be interpreted as
requiring affirmative conduct as the sole basis upon which to imply
consent to jurisdiction.166 Instead, Justice Stuart argued that because
implied consent is a legal fiction, consent to jurisdiction can be implied at
law by the accrual of a cause of action (in this case, the requisite injury to
establish a tort based on past negligent acts).167 Justice Stuart intended to
imply the nonresident defendant’s consent to Iowa jurisdiction based on
the defendant’s committing a negligent act before the long-arm statute’s
enactment that caused injury after the statute’s enactment.168 As Justice
Stuart seemed to admit, implied consent theory is a statutory vestige of old
personal jurisdiction law.169 One wonders why he relied on the fiction
160. See id. at 148 (Rawlings, J., dissenting) (“Furthermore the agency concept employed
by . . . the majority opinion, stemming from the designation of the Secretary of State as a process
agent is, in my humble opinion, mere fiction.”).
161. Id.
162. See id.
163. Id. (“There is nothing in the subject law which discloses the legislature intended it to be
applied prospectively and not retrospectively.”).
164. Chrischilles v. Griswold, 150 N.W.2d 94, 101 (Iowa 1967). Florida also applies the longarm statute in effect when the defendant commits the alleged “wrongful acts.” Conley v. Boyle Drug
Co., 570 So. 2d 275, 288 (Fla. 1990).
165. Chrischilles, 150 N.W.2d at 102 (Stuart, J., dissenting).
166. Id.
167. Id. at 101–02.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 102 (implying consent from affirmative conduct by the defendant “would have been
necessary when the United States Supreme Court held the fiction was [sic] implied consent was
necessary to confer jurisdiction[, which] is no longer the case”).
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earlier that year in Krueger.170
5. Statutory Non-Retroactivity
While vague statutory language and the outmoded use of implied
consent language forces many state courts to wrestle with retroactivity,
West Virginia's long-arm statute forecloses most of the discussion by
expressly disallowing retroactive application of its long-arm statute.171
Idaho’s long-arm statute expressly allows retroactivity but only as to the
jurisdiction-conferring act of conceiving a child in the state.172 Presumably,
a court would interpret the Idaho statute as implicitly disallowing
retroactive application for all other jurisdiction-conferring acts. The Idaho
and West Virginia approach benefits from some clarity, but, because
neither statute declares the moment at which the long-arm statute fixes,
courts still have statutory gaps to fill.
III. PROSPECTIVE-ONLY LONG-ARM STATUTES ARE
ILLOGICAL AND INEFFICIENT
First, the practical effect of the preceding discussion: litigators in
prospective-only states have, when applicable, a tremendous weapon for
obtaining a dismissal.173 Whenever a prospective-only state amends its
long-arm statute, all preceding behavior is judged for jurisdictional
purposes under the long-arm statute in effect at the measuring point.174 Of
the several situations in which this could prove useful, the most notable
involves a cause of action that accrues in the present but stems from a
defendant’s conduct in the distant past. Products liability stands out as a
frequently litigated cause of action that is often based on a defendant’s
conduct from years or even decades in the past.175 In several prospectiveonly states, the applicable long-arm statute is not the one in effect when the
cause of action accrues but the one in effect when the “wrongful conduct”
takes place.176 Because a defendant’s behavior may subject him to
jurisdiction under the present long-arm statute but not under the applicable
170. See Krueger v. Rheem Mfg. Co., 149 N.W.2d 142, 147 (Iowa 1967) (applying a more
literal perspective of implied consent while discussing Davis v. Jones, 78 N.W.2d 6 (Iowa 1956)).
171. W. VA. CODE § 56-3-33(g) (2012).
172. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 5-514(f) (2013).
173. Even in retroactive states, litigators may still be able to argue that their nonresident
client’s reliance on an earlier jurisdictional law makes jurisdiction unfair. See, e.g., Agrashell, Inc.
v. Bernard Sirotta Co., 344 F.2d 583, 586 (2d Cir. 1965).
174. See supra Section II.B. This assumes, of course, that the amendment is not explicitly
retroactive or changes the language of the statute sufficiently to give the courts good cause to apply
the amended statute retroactively.
175. See, e.g., Conley v. Boyle Drug Co., 570 So. 2d 275, 279 (Fla. 1990) (discussing, in a
1990 opinion, an injury that allegedly occurred between 1955 and 1956 to an unborn child).
176. See, e.g., Pub. Gas Co. v. Weatherhead Co., 409 So. 2d 1026, 1027 (Fla. 1982);
Chrischilles v. Griswold, 150 N.W.2d 94, 101 (Iowa 1967).
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past long-arm statute,177 prospective-only states afford litigators in these
situations the opportunity to obtain a quick dismissal. Belated recognition
of this usually inapplicable issue will result in a missed opportunity.178 In
spite of the opportunity that a prospective-only long-arm statute affords
litigators, this Part argues that prospective-only long-arm statutes are
illogical and inefficient.
A. Prospective-Only Long-Arm Statutes Lead to Illogical Results
In Conley v. Boyle Drug Co.,179 after being diagnosed with cervical
cancer, a Florida woman sued several drug companies on a market share
liability theory.180 The plaintiff alleged that her mother had used the
synthetic estrogen drug DES in 1955 and 1956, while the plaintiff was in
utero, and that the DES had caused the plaintiff’s cancer.181 More than
twenty years after the plaintiff was exposed to DES, her cause of action
accrued (upon her cancer diagnosis) and she sued.182 The Florida Supreme
Court held that the drug companies’ submission to personal jurisdiction in
Florida must be judged under the long-arm statute in effect when the
allegedly defective DES was manufactured.183 Applying the 1955 Florida
“doing business” personal jurisdiction statute, the court dismissed two
defendants.184
Although Conley was a fair application of existing Florida law, the idea
that a court in 1990 would apply a jurisdictional law from the 1950s
borders on the absurd, especially given the evolution of the constitutional
due process standard over the intervening thirty-five years. Thus, the first
reason for applying long-arm statutes retroactively: prospective-only
application of long-arm statutes leads to illogical results.
In Smith v. Trans-Siberian Orchestra,185 a federal district court in
Florida refused to retroactively apply a Florida Supreme Court
interpretation of the Florida long-arm statute on the theory that
retroactively applying the interpretation would deprive the plaintiff of fair
notice regarding which jurisdictional facts to allege.186 This case provides
several examples of the ways in which a fictional basis for denying longarm statute retroactivity can create problems for a court. First, Florida
177. See, e.g., Rose v. Franchetti, 979 F.2d 81, 84–85 (7th Cir. 1992) (considering
retroactively applying an amended Illinois long-arm statute that, unlike the older statute, “fits [this]
case nicely”).
178. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(1).
179. 570 So. 2d 275 (Fla. 1990).
180. Id. at 279.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 288.
184. Id. at 288–89.
185. 728 F. Supp. 2d 1315 (M.D. Fla. 2010).
186. Id. at 1322.
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retroactively applies statutory interpretations unless the Florida Supreme
Court specifically prescribes otherwise.187 The Gordon prospective-only
rule, which applies to amendments of the Florida long-arm statute,188
should not have been applied to an interpretation of the Florida long-arm
statute. Second, Trans-Siberian Orchestra cited the U.S. Supreme Court
opinion in Landgraf v. USI Film Products189 as supporting the notion that
the plaintiff is entitled to fair warning of what to allege.190 Fair warning in
the personal jurisdiction context applies to defendants, however, not to
plaintiffs.191 Trans-Siberian Orchestra apparently confused the detriment
that a plaintiff suffers in amending his complaint with the detriment that a
defendant suffers when he is subjected to a court’s jurisdiction without
notice of the possible bases for jurisdiction. Regardless of the detriment,
the U.S. Supreme Court distinguishes both pleading rules and jurisdictional
rules from the non-retroactivity principle.192 Attempting to faithfully apply
Florida’s rule against retroactive application of its long-arm statute, TransSiberian Orchestra shows that a rule based on a fiction can easily spiral
into an illogical result.
In House v. Hendley & Whittemore Co.,193 a products liability plaintiff
attempted to assert personal jurisdiction in Iowa under the present longarm statute based on the defendant’s continuing failure to warn of a
product defect.194 The Iowa Supreme Court held that implied consent to
jurisdiction requires that the defendant’s affirmative conduct fit within the
long-arm statute.195 Because the defendant’s only affirmative conduct
(manufacture and distribution of the goods) took place before the long-arm
statute was enacted, the defendant’s omissions (which continued after the
long-arm statute was enacted) did not establish the defendant’s consent to
Iowa jurisdiction.196
House’s application of the prospective-only rule adheres so firmly to
the implied consent fiction that it actually violates the plain language of the
long-arm statute. If failing to warn of a defective product constitutes a tort
in Iowa, then the plaintiff adequately alleged that the defendant
“commit[ted] a tort in whole or in part in Iowa against a resident of
187. Fla. Forest & Park Serv. v. Strickland, 18 So. 2d 251, 253 (Fla. 1944).
188. See supra text accompanying notes 104–12.
189. 511 U.S. 244 (1994).
190. Trans-Siberian Orchestra, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 1322.
191. See, e.g., Fibreboard Corp. v. Kerness, 625 So. 2d 457, 458 (Fla. 1993) (describing
retroactive application of long-arm statutes as violating the requirement of fair notice because “no
statute gave notice that [the defendant] might be called upon to defend an action in Florida”
(emphasis added)).
192. See Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 275 nn.28–29.
193. 251 N.W.2d 490 (Iowa 1977).
194. Id. at 492.
195. Id.
196. Id.
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Iowa.”197 Finding jurisdiction in the case would not require retroactive
application because the defendant’s ongoing failure to warn amounted to
the continuing commission of a tort (at least in part) in Iowa against an
Iowa resident. The Court, however, insisted that jurisdiction could only be
predicated upon affirmative acts that indicate a defendant’s consent.198
B. Prospective-Only Long-Arm Statutes Merely Duplicate
Constitutional Due Process Protections
When International Shoe established the minimum contacts standard,
the U.S. Supreme Court signaled a paradigm shift in personal jurisdiction
law from territorial and power bases to a fairness measure.199 In so doing,
the Court discussed a nonresident defendant’s amenability to suit200 and
later elaborated that a defendant expresses amenability by “purposefully
avail[ing] itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum
State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.”201 Purposeful
availment and amenability are similar to implied consent, but while
implied consent relies on the fiction of a nonresident defendant’s
consenting to jurisdiction, purposeful availment examines the quality and
quantity of a nonresident defendant’s contact with a state to determine if
the forum state can fairly exercise jurisdiction over the defendant.202 This
language shift is one of several necessary to transform personal jurisdiction
law from power-focused to fairness-focused.203
The implied consent legal fiction has long outlived its usefulness.204
Few corporations and even fewer citizens know what specific acts will
subject them to out-of-state jurisdiction. Of those who know anything
about out-of-state long-arm statutes, common sense suggests that only a
small fraction (if that) order their behavior around the statutes.205 Certainly
197. IOWA CODE § 617.3(2) (2013). The quoted language has remained the same since the
1960s. Krueger v. Rheem Mfg. Co., 149 N.W.2d 142, 143–44 (Iowa 1967).
198. House, 251 N.W.2d at 492.
199. Rhodes, supra note 28, at 400.
200. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 250–53 (1958).
201. Id. at 253 (citing Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945)).
202. See Rhodes, supra note 28, at 406. But see Patrick J. Borchers, J. McIntyre Machinery,
Goodyear, and the Incoherence of the Minimum Contacts Test, 44 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1245, 1264
(2011) (“Rather than attempting to recast minimum contacts as a proxy for state sovereignty, it
would have been more intellectually honest if the plurality had said that it hoped to overrule
International Shoe and return U.S. jurisdiction to Pennoyer-era notions of sovereignty and
consent.”); Henry S. Noyes, The Persistent Problem of Purposeful Availment, 45 CONN. L. REV. 41,
70–71 (2012) (describing Justice Kennedy’s plurality opinion in J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v.
Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2785 (2011) as resurrecting implied consent).
203. See Rhodes, supra note 28, at 406.
204. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 318 (1945) (“[S]ome of the decisions
holding the corporation amenable to suit have been supported by resort to the legal fiction that it
has given its consent to service and suit . . . .”).
205. But see J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2794 (2011) (Ginsburg, J.,
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state law affects corporate and individual behavior, but it is impractical for
either corporations or individuals to establish any contact with a state and
try to avoid falling into one of the enumerated acts of the state’s long-arm
statute.206 Because the vast majority of nonresident defendants act ignorant
of a foreign state’s jurisdictional rules, attaching unintended significance to
a defendant’s behavior embraces only a fictional version of justice.
Amenability has adequately replaced implied consent.
In addition to amenability, the “fair play and substantial justice”
element of personal jurisdiction due process analysis207 negates the need
for implied consent protection. If implied consent doctrine exists to protect
a nonresident from being subjected to jurisdiction under unfair terms, then
implied consent merely duplicates the protections of the fair play prong of
due process analysis.208 If an individual or corporation can show that he,
she, or it acted in actual reliance on a previous long-arm statute, then a
court should, in the interest of fair play, refuse to apply a long-arm statute
retroactively.209 This approach protects a nonresident’s actual expectations
without protecting fictional, implied expectations. The fair play and
substantial justice prong of constitutional due process personal jurisdiction
analysis sufficiently protects the interests that implied consent doctrine
sought to protect.
C. Long-Arm Statutes Are Remedial
Long-arm statutes are remedial. As several aforementioned cases
discuss, personal jurisdiction laws merely adjust the manner in which one
adjudicates a substantive right.210 That a state’s long-arm statute enables a
nonresident to be sued in that state does not affect whether there is a
substantive basis upon which to sue.211 A nonresident tortfeasor is subject
to suit for his offense regardless of whether the suit ultimately lies in North
Carolina or North Dakota. Long-arm statutes merely add a forum in which
a defendant can be sued.
On the other hand, the U.S. Supreme Court’s inclusion of a due process
dissenting) (suggesting that the foreign defendant engaged a U.S. distributor to ship its machines
within the United States in order to avoid products liability litigation in the United States).
206. See Rose v. Franchetti, 979 F.2d 81, 85 (7th Cir. 1992) (“[The nonresident defendant]
does not contend that in selling to a buyer from Illinois he relied on a belief that Illinois courts
would lack personal jurisdiction.”).
207. Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316.
208. See id. at 316–17.
209. Agrashell, Inc. v. Bernard Sirotta Co., 344 F.2d 583, 586 (2d Cir. 1965) (“[I]n the
absence of such a showing [of reliance on a prior long-arm statute], the limited retroactivity
prescribed . . . for these procedural provisions does not violate due process.”).
210. See supra Section II.A.
211. See, e.g., Rose, 979 F.2d at 85 (“Rules for personal jurisdiction do not regulate primary
conduct. Massachusetts substantive law governs this dispute no matter where the litigation
occurs . . . .”).
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requirement implies that there are rights at stake in the exercise of personal
jurisdiction over a nonresident.212 Because of the Court’s consistent
holding that jurisdictional statutes are not substantive and should be
applied retroactively,213 the due process requirement in the exercise of
personal jurisdiction over a nonresident protects a litigant’s procedural (not
substantive) rights.214 The right to a presumption against retroactive
application of a long-arm statute is not among them.215 Any additional
limitation on a state’s personal jurisdiction over a nonresident is selfimposed.
D. Prospective-Only Long-Arm Statutes Waste Judicial Resources
In addition to the waste of considering a jurisdictional challenge based
on a defendant’s fictional rights, prospective-only long-arm statutes will
inevitably force courts to consider the constitutionality of outdated,
superseded long-arm statute provisions. For example, J. McIntyre
Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro may have signaled an impending shift in the
U.S. Supreme Court’s approach to personal jurisdiction.216 In light of the
plurality opinion in that case, some long-arm statute provisions may exceed
the redefined limits of the Due Process Clause.217 In response to J.
McIntyre, offending provisions may be removed from a future version of
the long-arm statute. In prospective-only states, however, any cause of
action that arises from acts that precede passage of the new long-arm
statute will be adjudicated under the current, constitutionally questionable
long-arm statute.218 Despite the legislature’s effort to avoid constitutional
scrutiny, courts will have to evaluate the constitutionality of superseded
long-arm statutes, thereby undermining the remedial purpose of amending
a long-arm statute. In effect, the old long-arm statute echoes into the future,
haunting judges for years to come.

212. E.g., J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2789 (2011) (“Personal
jurisdiction, of course, restricts ‘judicial power not as a matter of sovereignty, but as a matter of
individual liberty,’ for due process protects the individual’s right to be subject only to lawful
power.” (emphasis added) (quoting Ins. Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de
Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 (1982))).
213. E.g., Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 274 (1994).
214. E.g., Diamond Crystal Brands, Inc. v. Food Movers Int’l, Inc., 593 F.3d 1249, 1259 (11th
Cir. 2010).
215. See McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 224 (1957).
216. See Rhodes, supra note 28, at 422 (“Both Justices Kennedy’s and Breyer’s opinions [in J.
McIntyre] therefore revived aspects of nineteenth and early twentieth century jurisdictional doctrine
expressly disavowed by International Shoe.”).
217. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 48.193(1)(f) (2012) (authorizing personal jurisdiction under
circumstances similar to the stream of commerce theory disallowed in J. McIntyre).
218. See generally supra Section II.B.
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CONCLUSION
While the majority of states with single-act long-arm statutes apply
amendments and new versions of their long-arm statutes retroactively, at
least six states do not. Because state courts control the interpretation of
state law, it would be overly simplistic to characterize state courts as wrong
to interpret their long-arm statutes as prospective only. This Note argues,
however, that refusing to apply a long-arm statute retroactively reflects bad
policy supported by bad logic.
In addition to occasionally forcing courts to apply dated jurisdictional
laws to modern causes of action, prospective-only long-arm statutes
impose upon courts the difficult task of fixing the point at which a
particular long-arm statute applies. Prospective-only long-arm statutes can
create sideshow trials on jurisdictional facts and can confuse courts about
the scope of the prospective-only principle. Prospective-only application of
long-arm statutes finds support neither from the Due Process Clause of the
U.S. Constitution nor from common law retroactivity analysis. Most states
that refuse to apply their long-arm statutes retroactively do so either
because they cling to the discredited implied consent fiction or because
they deviate from the consensus distinction between substance and
procedure. With a possible exception under the Due Process Clause for
cases in which a nonresident defendant in fact relies on the enumerated
acts of an older single-act long-arm statute, universal retroactive
application of state long-arm statutes best conforms to the modern
understanding of personal jurisdiction law.
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APPENDIX
Table: Retroactivity of Single-Act Long-Arm Statutes
Long-Arm Statute.

AK
CO

ALASKA STAT.
§ 09.05.015 (2012).
COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 13-1-124 (2012).

Implied
Consent
Language?
No.

Retroactive or
Prospective
Only?
Unknown.

Yes.

Retroactive.

CT

CONN. GEN. STAT.
§ 52-59b (2013).

No.

Retroactive.

DE

DEL. CODE. ANN.
tit. 10, § 3104
(2013).

Yes.

Retroactive.

FL

FLA. STAT.
§ 48.193 (2012).

Yes.

Prospective
Only.

GA

GA. CODE ANN.
§ 9-10-91 (2012).

No.

Prospective
Only.

HI

HAW. REV. STAT.
§ 634-35 (2012).

Yes.

Retroactive.
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Case on point.

N/A.
Hoen v. Dist.
Court, 412 P.2d
428 (Colo.
1966).
Carvette v.
Marion Power
Shovel Co., 249
A.2d 58 (Conn.
1968).
Eudaily v.
Harmon, 420
A.2d 1175 (Del.
1980).
Gordon v. John
Deere Co., 264
So. 2d 419
(Fla.1972).
Bauer Int’l
Corp. v.
Cagle’s, Inc.,
171 S.E.2d 314
(Ga. 1969).
Duple Motor
Bodies, Ltd. v.
Hollingsworth,
417 F.2d 231
(9th Cir. 1969)
(applying
Hawaii law).
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ID

IDAHO CODE ANN.
§ 5-514 (2013).

Yes.

Probably
Prospective
Only.

IL

735 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 5/2-209
(2012).

Yes.

Retroactive.

IA

IOWA CODE § 617.3
(2013).

Yes.

Prospective
Only.

KY

KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 454.210
(West 2012).

No.

Retroactive.

MD

MD. CODE ANN.,
CTS. & JUD. PROC.
§ 6-103 (West
2012)
MASS. GEN. LAWS
ch. 223A, § 3
(2012).

No.

Retroactive.

No.

Retroactive.

MICH. COMP. LAWS
§§ 600.705,
600.715, 600.725,
600.735 (2013).

No.

Retroactive.

MA

MI
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Long-arm
statute expressly
allows
retroactivity as
to the act of
conceiving a
child in Idaho,
suggesting that
the statute is not
retroactive in
any other
context.
Nelson v.
Miller, 143
N.E.2d 673 (Ill.
1957).
Krueger v.
Rheem Mfg.
Co., 149
N.W.2d 142
(Iowa 1967).
Rose v. E.W.
Bliss Co., 516
S.W.2d 329
(Ky. 1974).
Hardy v. Rekab,
Inc., 266 F.
Supp. 508 (D.
Md. 1967).
Kagan v. United
Vacuum
Appliance
Corp., 260
N.E.2d 208
(Mass. 1970).
Chovan v. E.I.
Du Pont De
Nemours & Co.,
217 F. Supp.
808 (E.D. Mich.
1963).
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MN

MINN. STAT.
§ 543.19 (2012).

No.

Retroactive.

MS

MISS. CODE ANN.
§ 13-3-57 (2013).

Yes.

Prospective
Only.

MO

MO. REV. STAT.
§ 506.500 (2012).

Yes.

Retroactive.

MT

MONT. R. CIV. P. 4.

No.

Retroactive.

NH

N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 510:4
(2013).

Yes.

Retroactive.

NM

N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 38-1-16 (2012).

Yes.

Retroactive.

NY

N.Y. C.P.L.R. 302
(McKinney 2013).

No.

Retroactive.

NC

N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 1-75.4 (2012).

No.

Retroactive.

ND

N.D.R. CIV. P. 4(b).

No.

Retroactive.
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Hunt v. Nev.
State Bank, 172
N.W.2d 292
(Minn. 1969).
Mladinich v.
Kohn, 186 So.
2d 481 (Miss.
1966).
Scheidegger v.
Greene, 451
S.W.2d 135
(Mo. 1970).
State ex rel.
Johnson v. Dist.
Court, 417 P.2d
109 (Mont.
1966).
Prop. Owners
Ass’n at
Suissevale, Inc.
v. Sholley, 284
A.2d 915 (N.H.
1971).
Gray v. Armijo,
372 P.2d 821
(N.M. 1962).
Simonson v.
Int’l Bank, 200
N.E.2d 427
(N.Y. 1964).
Fed. Ins. Co. v.
Piper Aircraft
Corp., 341 F.
Supp. 855
(W.D.N.C.
1972).
Keller v. Clark
Equip. Co., 367
F. Supp. 1350
(D.N.D. 1973),
rev’d on other
grounds, 570
F.2d 778 (8th
Cir. 1978).

32

Ullian: Retroactive Application of State Long-Arm Statutes

2013]

RETROACTIVE APPLICATION OF STATE LONG-ARM STATUTES

OH

OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2307.382
(2013).

No.

Retroactive.

SC

S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 36-2-803 (2012).

No.

Retroactive.

TX

TEX. CIV. PRAC. &
REM. CODE ANN.
§ 17.042 (West
2013).

No.

Retroactive.

UT

UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 78B-3-205
(2013).
VA. CODE ANN.
§ 8.01-328.1
(2013).
WASH. REV. CODE
§ 4.28.185 (2012).

No.

Unknown.

No.

Retroactive.

Yes.

Retroactive.

VA

WA

WV

W. VA. CODE § 563-33 (2012).

Yes.

Prospective
Only.

WI

WIS. STAT.
§ 801.05 (2013).

No.

Retroactive.
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Kilbreath v.
Rudy, 242
N.E.2d 658
(Ohio 1968).
Howard v.
Allen, 368 F.
Supp. 310
(D.S.C. 1973).
Lone Star
Motor Imp.,
Inc. v. Citroen
Cars Corp., 185
F. Supp. 48
(S.D. Tex.
1960), rev’d on
other grounds,
288 F.2d 69
(5th Cir. 1961).
N/A

Walke v. Dall.,
Inc., 161 S.E.2d
722 (Va. 1968).
Teague v.
Damascus, 183
F. Supp. 446
(E.D. Wash.
1960).
Long-arm
statute expressly
applies
prospectively
only.
Steffen v. Little,
86 N.W.2d 622
(Wis. 1957).
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